Consider this case:
"Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car.He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of American car."
Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe it?
From: Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” Philosophical Topics, 29, 429-460.
"Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car.He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of American car."
Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe it?
From: Weinberg, J., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” Philosophical Topics, 29, 429-460.
This case was proposed - see Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001), to a number of subjects both Western and from East Asia.
The striking finding is that a large majority of Ws give the standard answer in the philosophical literature, viz. “Only Believes.”
But amongst EAs this pattern is actually reversed!A majority of EAs say that Bob really knows.
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