- What does being the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist in?
- What matters in identity? The persistence of the body? Psychological continuity? The Brain? Think abou the condition of Leonard Shelby in Memento.
- Is it practically important to characterize precise identity conditions for a person? Why? Make examples.
- Imagine that a surgeon is going to put your brain into my head. Will the resulting person be you or I?
- Would the resulting person be responsible for my actions or yours?
- Assume that before the operation the surgeon explains to us that after the transplant the resulting person will be in pain. However he can mitigate the pain for a large sum of money which he has to receive in advance. Which of us should pay the surgeon?
- Imagine that all parts of your body except your brain (e.g. limbs, eyes, heart, lungs, liver, hair, skin etc) are replaced by artificial pieces. Would this male a difference with respect to your identity?
- Imagine further that the neurons of your brain are also replaced one by one with silicon chips with exactly the same functional properties of those neurons. Would you still be you? Is there a moment where you cease to exist?
- Think about cases of coma where people survive and awake after a while but without any memory, and with preferences different than before. Would this be a case where a person survives without existing afterwards?
- Is it important to distinguish personal identity from survival?
- Think about Memento. Is memory a necessary condition for personal identity? Is it sufficient?
- Consider a statue made of bronze. Is the statue identical to the lump of bronze?
- Is personal identity indeterminate (i.e. we have no reason to claim that someone has or has not ceased to exist after a certain event) in some cases?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
